Formal learning theory formalizes the process of inferring a general result from examples, as in the case of inferring grammars from sentences when learning a language. Although empirical evidence suggests that children can learn a language without responding to the correction of linguistic mistakes, the importance of Teacher in many other paradigms is significant. Instead of focusing only on learner(s), this work develops a general framework-the supervised learning game (SLG)-to investigate the interaction between Teacher and Learner. In particular, our proposal highlights several interesting features of the agents: on the one hand, Learner may make mistakes in the learning process, and she may also ignore the potential relation between different hypotheses; on the other hand, Teacher is able to correct Learner's mistakes, eliminate potential mistakes and point out the facts ignored by Learner. To reason about strategies in this game, we develop a modal logic of supervised learning (SLL). Broadly, this work takes a small step towards studying the interaction between graph games, logics and formal learning theory.
Introduction
Formal learning theory formalizes the process of inferring a general result from examples, as in the case of inferring grammars from sentences when learning a language. A good way of understanding this general process is by treating it as a game played by Learner and Teacher. It starts with a class of possible worlds, where one of them is the actual one chosen by Teacher. Learner's aim is to get to know which one it is. Teacher inductively provides information about the world, and whenever receiving a piece of information Learner picks a conjecture from the class, indicating which one she thinks is the case. Different success conditions for Learner can be defined. In this article we require that at some finite stage of the procedure Learner decides on a correct hypothesis. This kind of learnability is known as finite identification [17] .
Although empirical evidence suggests that children can learn a language without responding to the correction of linguistic mistakes [13] , the importance of teachers in many other paradigms is significant. For instance, in the paradigm of learning from queries and counterexamples [1], Teacher has a strong influence on whether the process is successful. Moreover, results in [12] suggest that a helpful Teacher may make learning easier. In this work, instead of focusing only on Learner, we highlight the interactive nature of learning.
As noted in [12] , a concise model for characterizing the interaction between Learner and Teacher is the sabotage game (SG). A SG is played on a graph with a starting node and a goal node, and it goes in rounds: Teacher first cuts an edge in the graph, then Learner makes a step along one of the edges still available. Both of them win iff Learner arrives at the goal node [19] . From the perspective of formal learning theory, this step-by-step game depicts a guided learning situation. Say, a natural interpretation is the situation of theorem proving. In this case, the starting node is given by axioms, the goal node stands for the theorem to be proved, other nodes represent lemmas conjectured by Learner, and edges capture Learner's possible inferences between them. Inferring is represented by moving along those edges. The information provided by Teacher can be treated as his feedback, i.e., removing edges to eliminate wrong inferences. The success condition is given by the winning condition: the learning process has been successful if Learner reaches the goal node, i.e., proving the theorem. For the general correspondence between SG and learning models, we refer to [12] .
However, we would argue that this application of SG gives a highly restricted model of learning. For instance,
• Intuitively, all links in the graph are inferences conjectured by Learner, which may include mistakes. From the perspective of Learner, the wrong inferences cannot be distinguished from the correct ones. Although it is reasonable to assume that Teacher is able to do so, SG does not highlight that Learner lacks perfect information. Besides, Teacher in SG has to remove a link in each round, which is overly restrictive. • Links removed represent wrong inferences between lemmas. So, whether or not a link deleted occurs in Learner's current proof (i.e., the current process) is important. If the proof includes a mistake, any inference after the mistake should not make sense. However, if a potential transition having not occurred in the proof is wrong, Learner can continue with her current proof. Clearly, SG cannot distinguish between these two cases. • The game does not distinguish between all the various ways Learner can reach the goal. That is, as long as Learner has come to the right conclusion, the game cannot tell us whether Learner has come to this conclusion in a coherent way. Reaching the correct hypothesis by wrong transitions is not reliable. The well-known Gettier cases [11] where one has justified true belief, but not knowledge are also examples of situations in which one wrongly reaches the right conclusion. Thus, the theory developed in [12] is subject to the Gettier problems.
• Teacher can only delete links to decide what Learner will not learn, and thus he only teaches what Learner has already conjectured. However, during the process of learning, 'possibilities may also be ignored due to the more questionable practice if assuming that one of the theories under consideration must be true. And complexity can come to be ignored through convention or habit' ( [16] , pp. 260). Hence, it is natural to assume that Learner may ignore the correct relation between different hypotheses.
In this paper, we therefore propose a new game, called the supervised learning game (SLG). This game differs from the SG on several accounts, motivated by the mentioned restrictions. Before introducing its definition, we first define some auxiliary notions.
Let S = w 0 , w 1 , ..., w n be a non-empty, finite sequence. We use e(S) to denote its last element. Define Set(S) := { w 0 , w 1 , w 1 , w 2 , ..., w n−1 , w n }. For the particular case when S is a singleton, Set(S) := ∅. Besides, for any w i , w i+1 ∈ Set(S), define S| wi,wi+1 := w 0 , w 1 , ..., w u , where w u , w u+1 = w i , w i+1 and w u , w u+1 = w j , w j+1 for any j < i. Intuitively, S| wi,wi+1 is obtained by deleting all elements occurring after w u from S, where w u , w u+1 is the first occurrence of w i , w i+1 in S. Say, when S = a, b, c, a, b , we have S| a,b = a . Now let us introduce SLG.
Definition 1 (SLG). A SLG W, R 1 , R 2 , s , g is given by a graph W, R 1 , R 2 , the starting node s and the goal node g. A position of the game is a tuple R i 1 , S i . The initial position R 0 1 , S 0 is given by R 1 , s . Round n + 1 from position R n 1 , S n is as follows: first, Learner moves from e(S n ) to any of its R 1 -successors s ′ ; then Teacher does nothing or acts out one of the following three choices: (3)). It ends if Learner arrives at g through an R 2 -path s, ..., g or cannot make a move, with them winning in the former case and losing in the latter.
Intuitively, the clause for Learner illustrates that she cannot distinguish the links starting from the current position. The sequence S i is her current learning process, which may include mistakes; R 1 represents Learner's possible inferences between conjectures; and R 2 is the correct inferences. For any position R n 1 , S n we have Set(S n ) ⊆ R n 1 . Besides, both (2) and (3) above are concerned with the case that Teacher eliminates wrong transitions, but there is an important difference. The former one concerns the case that Teacher gives Learner a counterexample to show that she has gone wrong somewhere in her current process, so Learner should move back to the conjecture right before the wrong transition. In contrast, (3) illustrates that Teacher eliminates a wrong transition conjectured that has not occurred in Learner's process yet, therefore this action does not modify Learner's current process.
From the winning condition, we know that both the players cooperate with each other. It is important to recognize that Learner's action does not conflict with her cooperative nature: she makes an effort to achieve the goal in each round. Moreover, it is not hard to see that players cannot win when there exists no R 2 -path from the starting node to the goal node. This is reasonable, since their interaction makes sense only when the goal is learnable. The correlation between the situation of theorem proving and SLG is shown in Table 1 . Transition from a to b Proof for a R1-sequence from the starting node to a Correct proof for a R1-sequence S from the starting node to a and Set(S) ⊆ R2 Giving a counterexample to the inference from a to b in the proof S
Giving a counterexample to the conjectured inference from a to b not in the proof S Deleting a, b from R1 ( a, b ∈ Set(S))
Pointing out a potential inference from a to b not conjectured by Learner before Extending R1 with a, b
Remark 1. The interpretation of SLG presented in Table 1 can be easily adapted to characterize other paradigms in formal learning theory, such as language learning and scientific inquiry. More generally, any single-agent games, such as solitaire and computer games, can be converted into SLG. Say, the player (Learner) does not know the correct moves well, but she knows the starting position and the goal position, and has some conjectures about the moves of the game. Besides, she can be taught by Teacher: she just attempts to play it, while Teacher instructs her positively (by revealing more correct moves) or negatively (by pointing out incorrect moves, in which case Learner may have to be moved back to the moment previous to the first incorrect move, if she made any).
Example 1. Let us consider a simple example of SLG, as depicted in Figure 1 . The starting node is a and the goal node is G. We show that players have a winning strategy by depicting the game to play out as follows. Learner begins with moving along the only available edge to node b. Teacher in his turn can make e, f 'visible' to Learner by adding it to R 1 . Then, Learner proceeds to move along b, c , and Teacher extends b, e to R 1 . Afterwards, Learner continues on the only option c, G . Although she now has already arrived at the goal node, her path a, b, c, G is not an R 2 -sequence. So, Teacher can remove b, c moving Learner back to node b. Next, Learner has to move to e, and Teacher can delete c, G from R 1 . Finally, Learner can arrives at G in 2 steps with Teacher doing nothing. Now we have Set( a, b, e, f, G ) ⊆ R 2 , so they win. To reason about players' strategies in SLG, in what follows we will study SLG from a modal perspective. Sabotage modal logic (SML) [5] is known to be a suitable tool to characterize SG, which extends basic modal logic with a sabotage modality − ϕ stating that there is an edge such that, ϕ is true at the evaluation node after deleting the edge from the model. However, given the differences between SG and SLG, we will develop a novel modal logic of supervised learning (SLL) to capture SLG.
Outline. Section 2 introduces SLL along with its application to SLG and some preliminary observations. Section 3 studies the expressivity of SLL. Section 4 investigates the model checking problem and satisfiability problem for SLL. We end this paper by Section 5 on conclusion and future work.
Modal Logic of Supervised Learning (SLL)
To be an ideal tool, the logic SLL should at least be able to precisely express players' actions and depict their winning strategies. In this section, we first introduce its language and semantics. Then we analyze its applications to SLG. Finally, we make various observations, including some logical validities and relations between SLL and other logics.
Language and Semantics
We begin by considering the action of Learner. In SML, the standard modality ♦ characterizes the transition from a node to its successors and corresponds well to Learner's actions in SG. However, operator ♦ is not any longer sufficient in our case. Note that after Teacher cuts a link w, v from Learner's current process S, Learner should start from w with the new path S| w,v in the next round. Therefore, the desired operator should remember the history of Learner's movements.
To capture Teacher's action, a natural place to start is by defining operators that correspond to link addition and deletion. There is already a body of literature on logics of these modalities, such as the sabotage operator − and the bridge operator + [3] . As mentioned, each occurrence of − in a formula deletes exactly one link whereas the bridge operator adds links stepwise to models. Yet, including these two modalities is still not enough. For instance, we need to take into account whether or not a link deleted by Teacher is a part of the path of Learner's movements. We now introduce SLL. First, let us define its language.
Definition 2 (Language L). Let P be a countable set of propositional atoms. The formulas of L are recursively defined in the following way:
where p ∈ P. Notions ⊤, ⊥, ∨ and → are as usual. Besides, we use , [−] 1 , [−] 2 and [+] to denote the dual operators of , − 1 , − 2 and + respectively.
Several fragments of L will be studied in the following of the article. For brevity, we use a notational convention listing in subscript all modalities of the corresponding language. For instance, L is the fragment of L that has only the operator (besides Boolean connectives ¬ and ∧); L − 2 has only the modality − 2 ; L − 1 has only the modality and − 1 , etc. We now proceed to define the models of SLL.
Definition 3 (Models, Pointed Models and Frames).
A model of SLL is a tuple M = W, R 1 , R 2 , V , where W is a non-empty set of possible worlds, R i∈{1,2} ⊆ W 2 are two binary relations and V : P → 2 W is a valuation function. F = W, R 1 , R 2 is a frame. Let S be an R 1 -sequence, i.e., Set(S) ⊆ R 1 . We name M, S a pointed model, and S an evaluation sequence. Usually we write M, S instead of M, S .
For brevity, we call R 1 the conjectured relation and R 2 the correct relation. Besides, we use M to denote the class of pointed models and M • the class of pointed models whose sequence S is a singleton. Before introducing the semantics, let us define some preliminary notations.
Besides, for a sequence S, define R i (S) := R i (e(S)), i.e., the R i -successors of a sequence S are exactly the R i -successors of its last element. For brevity, we also use S; v to denote the sequence extending S with node v.
We now have enough background to introduce the semantics of SLL.
Definition 4 (Semantics). Let M, S be a pointed model and ϕ ∈ L. The semantics of SLL is defined as follows:
By the semantics, a propositional atom p is true at a sequence S if and only if p is true at the last element of S. The cases for ¬ and ∧ are as usual. Formula ϕ states that e(S) has an R 1 -successor v such that ϕ is true at sequence S; v.
Both − 1 and − 2 require that the link deleted cannot be an R 2 -edge. Intuitively, whereas − 1 depicts the case when Teacher deletes a link from Learner's path S, − 2 captures the situation that the link deleted is not a part of S. Finally, + ϕ means that after extending R 1 with a new link belonging to R 2 , ϕ holds at the current sequence.
A formula ϕ is satisfiable if there is a pointed model M, S ∈ M with M, S ϕ. Validity in a model and in a frame is defined in the usual way. Note that the relevant class of models to specify SLL is M • , that is, models where the evaluation sequence S starts with a singleton. Hence SLL is the set of L-formulas that are valid in the class M • .
For any M, S and M ′ , S ′ , we say that they are learning modal equivalent
We can also iterate this order, to talk about models reachable in finitely many U-steps, obtaining the relation U * .
Application: Winning Strategies in SLG
By Definition 4, captures the actions of Learner, and operators + , − 1 and − 2 characterize those of Teacher. Besides, our logic is expressive enough to describe the winning strategy (if there is one) for players in finite graphs. 3 Given a finite SLG, let p be a distinguished atom holding only at the goal node. Generally, the winning strategy of Learner and Teacher will be of the following form:
where i is blank or one of − 1 , − 2 and + for each i ≤ n. In this formula, the recurring operator depicts Learner's actions and i Teacher's response. The proposition p signalizes Learner's arrival at the goal, and [−] 1 ⊥ states that there are no edges in Learner's path that Teacher can cut. Hence, we can conclude that Learner has reached the goal through a sequence of correct edges. It is worth noting that in formula (1) we use , other than , to represent Learner's action, although SLG is a cooperative game. Recall the graph in Figure 1 . We observe that
holds at the starting node a, so there exists a winning strategy in this specific SLG.
Remark 2. In SG we know that links cut by Teacher represent wrong inferences. However, SG does not tell us anything about the links that remain in the graph. Therefore, winning strategies of the players in SG cannot guarantee against situations like Gettier cases. In contrast, the formula [−] 1 ⊥ in (1) ensures that Teacher is not allowed to remove any more links from Learner's path. In SLG, a Gettier-style case is that Learner arrives at the goal node with some u, v ∈ R 1 \ R 2 occurring in her path, so Teacher now would be allowed to cut those links. Therefore Gettier cases cannot be winning strategies in SLG.
Preliminary Observations
As observed, the semantics of SLL is not simple. In this section, we make some preliminary observations on SLL. In particular, we will discuss the relations between SLL and other related logics, and present some logical validities.
First of all, we have the following result on the relation between L and standard modal logic: Proof. The proof is done by induction on the syntax of ϕ. The Boolean cases are trivial. When ϕ is ψ, it holds that:
The first equivalence follows from Definition 4 directly. By the inductive hypothesis, the second one holds. The last one holds by the semantics of standard modal logic. ⊓ ⊔ Therefore, essentially the fragment L of L is standard modal logic. Moreover, the operator − 2 is much similar to the sabotage operator − :
Proof. We prove it by induction on the structure of ϕ. The Boolean cases are straightforward. When ϕ is − 2 ψ, it holds that:
The first equivalence follows straightforward from the semantics of SLL. By the inductive hypothesis and the definition of R, we have the second equivalence. The last one holds by the truth condition for the sabotage modality. ⊓ ⊔ Next, we have the following result on the relation between L + and the 'bridge modal logic (BML)' (i.e., the logic expanding the standard modal logic with the bridge operator):
Proof. This goes by induction on the syntax of ϕ. The Boolean cases are trivial. The case for is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. When ϕ is + ψ, it holds that:
The first equivalence follows our semantics. By the inductive hypothesis and the definition of R 2 , the second one holds. The last one holds by the semantics of bridge modal logic. ⊓ ⊔ From Proposition 1-3, we know that several fragments of SLL are similar to other logics that have been studied. However, as a whole, SLL is not a loose aggregation of these fragments: different operators interact with each other. A typical example is that, for any M, w ∈ M • , the formula
is valid, as Set(w) = ∅. However, formula ¬[−] 1 ϕ is satisfiable. This presents a drastic difference between SLL and other logics mentioned so far: in those logics, it is impossible that the evaluation point has access to a node satisfying a contradiction. In order to understand how operators in SLL work, we present some other validities of SLL. 
Note that formulas (3)-(5) above are not schemata. Although they will still be valid if we replace each propositional atom occurring in them with any Boolean formula, substitution fails in the general case. In particular, we have the following result: Interestingly, SLL also has other features that are very different from standard modal logic. For instance, it lacks the tree model property, which holds directly by the following result: Proposition 6. L − 1 does not have the tree model property.
Proof. Consider the following formulas:
. We now show that, for any model M = W, R 1 , R 2 , V and w ∈ W , if M, w ϕ T , then R 1 ww. By formula (T 1 ), node w is p, and it has at least one p-successor w 1 and at least one ¬p-successor w 2 via relation R 1 . Besides, (T 2 ) states that, each such p-successor w 1 of w also can reach some p-node w 3 and ¬p-node w 4 by R 1 . Finally, from (T 3 ) we know that w can only reach one ¬p-point by R 1 and that w 1 does not have ¬p-successors via R 1 any longer after cutting w, w 2 . So, w, w 2 is identical with w 1 , w 4 , which is followed by R 1 ww directly. Besides, formula ϕ T is indeed satisfiable with respect to M • . Consider the model depicted in Figure 3 . It is not hard to see that ϕ T is true at w. Hence L − 1 lacks the tree model property.
⊓ ⊔ w p w1 1 1 As observed, many instances of validities in our logic are not straightforward, and SLL has some distinguishing features. The results that we have so far are not sufficient enough to understand SLL. In the sections to come we will make a deeper investigation into our logic.
Expressive Power of SLL
In this section, we study the expressivity of SLL. First, we will show that SLL is still a fragment of first-order logic even though it looks complicated. After this, a suitable notion of bisimulation for SLL is introduced. Finally, we provide a characterization theorem for the logic.
First-Order Translation
Given the complicated semantics, is SLL still a fragment of FOL? In this section we will provide a positive answer to this question. To do so, we will describe a translation from SLL to FOL. However, compared with that for standard modal logic [7] , we now need some new devices.
Let L 1 be the first-order language consisting of countable unary predicates P i∈N , two binary relations R i∈{1,2} , and equality ≡. Take any finite, non-empty sequence E of variables. Let y and y ′ be two fresh variables not appearing in E. When there exists x, x ′ ∈ Set(E) with x ≡ y and x ′ ≡ y ′ , we define E| y,y ′ := E| x,x ′ . Now let us define the first-order translation.
Definition 5 (First-Order Translation). Let E = x 0 , x 1 , ..., x n be a finite sequence of variables (non-empty), and
.., u j , u ′ j } two finite sets of links. The translation T (ϕ, E, E + , E − ) from L-formulas ϕ to first-order formulas is defined recursively as follows:
From the perspective of SLG, the sequence E denotes Learner's process, and sets E + and E − represent the links that have already been added and deleted respectively. In any translation τ (ϕ, E, E + , E − ), each of E + and E − may be extended. For any their extensions E + ∪ X and E − ∪ Y , we have X ∩ Y = ∅. Intuitively, this fact is in line with our semantics: for any W, R 1 , R 2 , V , S , we always have Set(S) ⊆ R 1 and (R 1 \ R 2 ) ∩ (R 2 \ R 1 ) = ∅, therefore links deleted are different from those added. Another point worth mentioning is that, unlike the case of standard modal logic, generally the translation does not yield a first-order formula with only one free variable. However, it does so when we set E, E + and E − to be a sequence consisting of a singleton, ∅ and ∅ respectively. By Definition 5, we have the following result: 
Proof. The proofs for these two cases are similar. We only prove the first one.
(1). When ϕ is p ∈ P, we have the following equivalences:
The first equivalence holds by Definition 5 directly. The second one follows from the definition of M ⊖ v, v ′ . The last one follows by Definition 5.
(2). The proofs for the Boolean connectives are straightforward.
(3). ϕ is ψ. By v, v ′ ∈ R 1 \ R 2 , the definitions of M ⊖ v, v ′ and the standard translation, it holds that:
(4). When ϕ is − 1 ψ, we have that:
The following equivalences hold:
. When ϕ is + ψ, it holds that:
The proof is completed.
⊓ ⊔
With Lemma 1, we now can show the correctness of the translation: Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of ϕ.
(1). Formula ϕ is a propositional atom p ∈ P. By the semantics of SLL, M, S ϕ if and only if e(S) ∈ V (p). On the other hand, by Definition 5,
(2). The cases for Boolean connectives ¬ and ∧ are trivial.
(3). When ϕ is ψ, we have the following equivalences: (4). When ϕ is − 1 ψ, it holds that:
(6). If ϕ is + ψ, then we have:
This completes the proof.
⊓ ⊔ Note that the translation in Theorem 1 has an extra requirement on the sequence E, i.e., Set(E) ⊆ R 1 . Intuitively, this restriction corresponds to the definition of pointed models. For each M, w ∈ M • , any extension E ′ of w fulfils the requirement naturally by Definition 5.
Bisimulation and Characterization for SLL
The notion of bisimulation serves as a useful tool for establishing the expressive power of modal logics. However, it is not hard to see that SLL is not closed under the standard bisimulation [7] . In this section we introduce a novel notion of 'learning bisimulation (l-bisimulation)' tailored to our logic, which leads to a characterization theorem for SLL as a fragment of first-order logic.
Definition 6 (l-Bisimulation). For any two models M = W, R 1 , R 2 , V and
is an l-bisimulation between the two pointed models M, S and M ′ , S ′ (notation: M, S Z l M ′ , S ′ ) if the following conditions are satisfied:
Zag , Zag − 1 , Zag − 2 and Zag + : the analogous clauses in the converse direction of Zig , Zig − 1 , Zig − 2 and Zig + respectively.
For brevity, we write
The clauses for is similar to those for the basic modality in the standard bisimulation: they keep the model fixed and extend the evaluation sequence with some of its R 1 -successors. In contrast, all of the conditions for − 1 , − 2 and + change the model. In particular, clauses for − 2 and + do not modify the evaluation sequence, while those for − 1 change both the model and the current sequence. Now we can show the following result:
Theorem 2 (↔ l ⊆ l ). For any pointed models M, S and M ′ , S ′ , it holds that:
Proof. The proof goes by induction on ϕ. Assume that M, S ↔ l M ′ , S ′ . The Boolean cases are straightforward.
By the inductive hypothesis, it holds that M, S; v l M ′ , S ′ ; v ′ , consequently, M ′ , S ′ ; v ′ ψ, which is followed by M ′ , S ′ ϕ immediately. Similarly, we can obtain M, S ϕ from M ′ , S ′ ϕ by Zag .
(
In a similar way, when M ′ , S ′ ϕ, we can prove M, S ϕ by Zag − 1 .
Moreover, the converse direction of Theorem 2 holds for the models that are ω-saturated. To introduce its definition, we need some auxiliary notations. For each finite set Y , we denote the expansion of L 1 with a set Y of constants with L Y 1 , and denote the expansion of
Proof. We prove this by showing that l itself is an l-bisimulation. In what follows, assume that E ′ is an R ′ 1 -sequence of variables with the same size as S ′ . (1). For each p ∈ P, by the definition of l , it holds directly that M, S p iff M ′ , S ′ p. This satisfies the condition of Atom.
(2). Let v ∈ R 1 (S). We will prove that there is some
For any finite Γ ⊆ T l (M, S; v), the following equivalences hold:
The first equivalence holds by the assumption that M, S l M ′ , S ′ . The second one follows from Theorem 1 and the last one from Definition 5.
Since
Now the proof of the Zig clause is completed.
(3). Similar to (2), we can prove that the Zag condition is satisfied.
, then we have the following equivalences:
The first equivalence holds straightforward from the assumption of learning modal equivalence between M, S and M ′ , S ′ . The second one follows from Theorem 1, and the third equivalence holds by Definition 5.
. W.l.o.g., assume that y and z are assigned to u ′ and v ′ respectively. By Lemma 1, we have
Therefore, the proof of the Zig − 1 clause is completed. (5) . Similar to (4), we can prove that the Zag − 1 condition is satisfied. (6) . Assume that u, v ∈ (R 1 \ R 2 ) \ Set(S). We now prove that there exists
For any finite Γ ⊆ T l (M ⊖ u, v , S), it holds that:
The first equivalence follows from M, S l M ′ , S ′ directly. The second holds from Theorem 1, and the third equivalence holds by Definition 5.
As
. W.l.o.g., assume that y and z are assigned to u ′ and v ′ respectively. From Lemma 1, we know
Now the proof of the Zig − 2 clause is completed. (7) . Similar to (6) , we can show that Zag − 2 is also satisfied. (8) . Let u, v ∈ R 2 \ R 1 . We now prove that the Zig + condition is satisfied. Assume that Γ is a finite subset of T l (M ⊕ u, v , S). Then the following it holds that Γ → α for some finite subset Γ of C l (α). Besides, by the definition of C l (α), we have α → Γ . Thus, α ↔ Γ . Now the proof is completed.
⊓ ⊔ Therefore, in terms of the expressivity, SLL is as powerful as the one free variable fragment of first-order logic that is invariant for l-bisimulation.
Model Checking and Satisfiability for SLL
In this section, we consider the the model checking problem and satisfiability problem for SLL. Fortunately, the results that we have already shown are quite helpful to establish the complexity result for its model checking problem. First of all, as noted in [3] , it holds that:
Theorem 5. Model checking for BML is PSPACE-complete (see [3] ).
By this result, we now can show that model checking for SLL is also PSPACEcomplete. Theorem 6. Model checking for SLL is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. An upper bound can be established bt the first-order translation given by Definition 5, which has only a polynomial size increase. It is well-known that model checking for FOL is in PSPACE.
Besides, an lower bound can be provided with the help of a translation f from the bridge modal logic into the fragment L + . More precisely, f is the reverse of the translation defined in Proposition 3. Clearly, the translation f also has a polynomial size increase. Besides, let W, R 1 , V be a standard relational model and w ∈ W . It is not hard to see that W, R 1 , V , w ϕ iff W, R 1 , W 2 , V , w f (ϕ) (recall Proposition 3). From Theorem 5, we know that model checking for SLL is PSPACE-hard.
Therefore, model checking for SLL is PSPACE-complete. ⊓ ⊔
Note that Theorem 6 also establishes an upper bound for the complexity of SLG. Now we move to considering the satisfiability problem for SLL. In particular, we have the following result: Theorem 7. L − 1 does not enjoy the finite model property.
Proof. To prove this, we present a formula that can only be satisfied by some infinite models. Consider the following formulas:
Let formula ϕ ∞ be the conjunction of the formulas above. We first show that ϕ ∞ is satisfiable. Consider the model depicted in Figure 4 . It holds that ϕ ∞ is true at w.
Next, we prove that for any model
is the set of the p-points that can be reached by w in one step via R 1 . In what follows, we assume that all previous conjuncts hold.
By (F 1 ), node w is (p∧q), and it cannon see any q-points via R 1 . In particular, it cannot see itself via R 1 . Besides, w has at least one p-successor and at least one ¬p-successor via R 1 , i.e., B = ∅ and R 1 (w) \ B = ∅.
From formula (F 2 ), we know that each element in B can see some (q ∧ p)point(s) and (¬q ∧p)-point(s) via R 1 , but cannot see any ¬p-points by R 1 . Hence each point in B has at least one R 1 -successor distinct from itself.
According to formula (F 3 ), for any w 1 ∈ B, each its R 1 -successor that is q can see some ¬p-point(s) via R 1 , but cannot see any q-points by R 1 .
By (F 4 ), it holds that R 1 (w) \ B = ∅ includes only one element. Moreover, each w 1 ∈ B can see point w via R 1 , and for each q-point w 2 ∈ W , if w 2 is a successor of w 1 via R 1 , then w 2 must be w.
Formulas (F 2 )-(F 4 ) show the properties of the (¬q ∧ p)-points which are accessible from the point w in one step by R 1 . Similarly, formulas (F 5 ), (F 6 ) and (F 7 ) play the same role as (F 2 ), (F 3 ) and (F 4 ) respectively, but focusing on showing the properties of the (¬q ∧ p)-points that are accessible from w in two steps via R 1 . In particular, (F 7 ) guarantees that every (¬q ∧ p)-point w 1 which is accessible from w in two steps by R 1 can also see w via R 1 , and that for each q-point w 2 ∈ W , if R 1 w 1 w 2 , then w 2 must be w.
Formula (Spy) is a bit complicated. It shows that, for any two (¬q ∧ p)points w 1 and w 2 such that R 1 ww 1 and R 1 w 1 w 2 , after we delete some link v, v ′ ∈ { w, w 1 , w 1 , w 2 , w 2 , w }, v is ¬q and does not have any q-successors. Since w is q, v cannot be w. Besides, if v, v ′ = w 1 , w 2 , after we cut the link v, v ′ , v still have one q successor, i.e., w, so we have v, v ′ = w 2 , w w . Further more, after we delete w, w 1 , w can reach a p-point w 3 via R 1 such that w 3 has no q successor via R 1 . Therefore, w 3 must be w 2 . In such a way, (Spy) ensures that each (¬q ∧ p)-point w 1 which is accessible from w in two steps via R 1 is also accessible from w in one step via R 1 .
By (Irr ), each w 1 ∈ B is irreflexive. Finally, (No-3cyc) shows that the accessibility relations of R 1 cannot be cycles of length 2 or 3 in B, and (Trans) forces the accessibility relation R 1 to transitively order B.
Hence (B, R 1 ) is an unbounded strict partial order, thus B is infinite and so is W . Now we know that ϕ ∞ is satisfiable, and that for each M, w , if M, w ϕ ∞ , then M is an infinite model. This completes the proof. We now proceed to show the undecidability of L − 1 . To do so, we will reduce the N × N tiling problem to the satisfiability problem of this fragment.
A tile t is a 1 × 1 square, of fixed orientation, with colored edges right(t), left(t), up(t) and down(t). The N × N tiling problem is: given a finite set of tile types T , is there a function f : N × N → T with right(f(n,m))=left(f(n+1,m)) and up(f(n,m))=down(f(n,m+1))? This problem is known to be undecidable ( [15] ).
Inspired by the technique in [8] , we will use three kinds of modalities s , u and r to stand for . Correspondingly, a model M = {W, R s , R u , R r , R 2 , V } now has four kinds of relations. We are going to construct a spy point over relation R s . Besides, R u and R r represent moving up and to the right, respectively, from one tile to the other. Intuitively, the union of these three relations can be treated as the R 1 relation of the model. Moreover, as illustrated by the following proof, they are disjoint with each other. So they are a partition of R 1 . Thanks to this fact, we do not need any extra modalities to represent − 1 .
Theorem 8. The satisfiability problem for L − 1 is undecidable.
Proof. Assume that T = {T 1 , ..., T n } be a finite set of tile types. For each T i ∈ T , u(T i ), d(T i ), l(T i ) and r(T i ) are the colors of its up, down, left and right edges respectively. Besides, each tile type is coded with a fixed propositional atom t i . Now we will show that ϕ T , the conjunction of the following formulas, is satisfiable iff T tiles N × N .
, and it has some q-successor(s) w 1 via relation R s where each w 1 can see some ¬p-point(s) via R s .
By formula (M 5 ), each w 1 ∈ W accessible from a tile via R u or R r can see w by R s . Also, for each (q ∧ p)-point w 2 ∈ W , if it is accessible from w 1 via R s , then w 2 = w.
Formula (M 6 ) ensures that each w 1 ∈ W that is accessible from a tile via R u or R r also has some successor(s) via R u and some successor(s) via R r . Besides, each its successor via R u or R r is (¬q ∧ p).
From formula (M 7 ), it follows that both R u and R r are irreflexive and asymmetric.
By (Spy), w is a spy point via the relation R s . Note that formula (M 4 ) says that each tile has some tile(s) above it and some tile(s) to its right. Now, with (Func), we have that each tile has exactly one tile above it and exactly one tile to its right.
By (No-UR), any tile cannot be above/below as well as to the left/right of another tile. Formula (No-URU ) disallows cycles following successive steps of the R u , R r , and R u relations, in this order. Moreover, (Conv ) ensures that the tiles are arranged as a grid.
Formula (Unique) guarantees that each tile has a unique type. Finally, (Vert ) and (Horiz ) force the colors of the tiles to match properly.
Thus we conclude that M is indeed a tiling of N × N . In particular, w is a spy point in M. By construction, we have M, w ϕ T . ⊓ ⊔ By Theorem 7-8, it holds directly that: Theorem 9. SLL lacks the finite model property, and its satisfiability problem is undecidable.
Conclusion and Future Work
Summary Motivated by restrictions on learning in SG, we have extended the game to SLG by naming right and wrong paths of learning, and let Teacher not only delete but also add links. Afterwards, logic SLL was presented, which enables us to reason about players' strategies in SLG. Besides, to understand the new device, we provided some interesting observations and logical validities. Next, we studied basics of its expressivity, including its first-order translation, a novel notion of bisimulation and a characterization theorem for SLL as a fragment of FOL that is invariant under the bisimulation introduced. Finally, it was proved that model checking for SLL is PSPACE-complete, and via the research on L − 1 we shown that SLL does not enjoy the finite model property and its satisfiability problem is undecidable.
Relevant and Future Research Broadly, this work takes a small step towards studying the interaction between graph games, logics and formal learning theory. We are inspired by the work on SG [19] , SML [5] and their application to formal learning theory [12] . This article is also relevant to other work studying graph games with modal logics, such as [9, 14, 18, 20] . Technically, the logic SLL has resemblances to several recent logics with model modifiers, such as [2, 3, 4] . Besides, instead of updating links, [21] considers a logic of stepwise point deletion, which sheds light on the long-standing open problem of how to axiomatize the sabotage-style modal logics. Moreover, [21] is also helpful to understand the complexity jumps between dynamic epistemic logics of model transformations and logics of freely chosen graph changes recorded in current memory. Another relevant line of research for this paper is epistemic logics. As mentioned already, one goal of our work is to avoid the Gettier problem. Similar to this, [6] uses the topological semantics to study the full belief.
Except what have been studied in this article, there are still various open problems deserving to be studied. From the logic point of view, Section 2.2 shows that logic SLL is able to express the winning positions for players in finite games, but to capture those for infinite games, can SLL be expanded with some leastfixpoint operators? From the translation described in Definition 5 we know that SLL are effectively axiomatizable. However, is it possible to axiomatize the logic via a Hilbert-style calculus? In terms of games, we do not know the complexity of SLG, although Theorem 6 provides us with an upper bound. Besides, SLG includes exactly two players, and it is also meaningful to study the cases that are more general.
